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Abstract 
Based on a traditional approach to the behavior of a bank which lends both private 
and public sector, and utilizing a typical expression for public debt accumulation, this 
paper concludes that the optimality of the number and size of banks depends heavily 
on the course of the public debt, ceteris paribus. If the intergenerational dimension of 
the public debt is assumed away, fiscal consolidation presupposes a limited number of 
banks under normal only profit, a sort of quasi-competitive banking. In the presence 
of intergenerational considerations, fiscal consideration requires a few efficient banks 
experiencing perhaps positive profit, which is consistent with the notion of workable 
competition. Consequently, the pre-consolidation size distribution of banks is 
immaterial policy-wise.  
Keywords:  Optimum number of banks, Public debt accumulation, Perfect vs. 
workable competition, Commercial bank seigniorage                                                                                                         
JEL Codes: E50, G20, L10 
1. Introduction 
What is the optimum number of banks? Certainly the one for which “after the 
structural characteristics of [the financial] market and the dynamic forces that shaped 
them have been thoroughly examined, there is no clearly indicated change that can be 
effected through public policy measures that would result in greater social gains than 
social losses”: This is what Markham (1950, p. 361) would have claimed quite 
persuasively as an operational norm for workable competition in the banking industry 
à la Clark (1940, 1961). The capitalist dynamics evolve around the growth of 
increasingly large lending clients eliciting the growth of big lenders beyond the 
smaller ones just because the latter cannot meet the increasing demand for loans.  
Contrary to what theory predicts (see e.g. Worcester 1957 and Gowrisankaran 
and Holmes 2004) and evidence verifies for sectors outside banking (see e.g. White 
1996 and Gowrisankaran and Holmes 2004), the coexistence of a few large banks 
with smaller ones, and even with a competitive fringe like in Germany, has come up 
as the “rule” rather than as a short-run phenomenon (see e.g Coccorese 2002), 
because big banks come to cover the part of the loan market that the smaller ones 
would ration. Big banks can do so, because presumably of cost efficiencies absent 
from small banks and reflected in stock returns (see e.g. Kirkwood and Nahm 2006). 
Instead, small banks appear to be benefiting from moderate scope economies (see e.g. 
Allen and Liu 2007 and Berger and Humphrey 1993), which might be attributed to the 
better relationship banking of such banks (see e.g. Dijkstra 2013). Others, like Boot 
(2003), maintain that although scale and scope economies exist, in principle, they are 
difficult to attain in practice without further competition. 
The big picture for the countries at least examined by these studies, namely 
Australia, Canada, United States, and Eurozone countries, is that the industry has 
stuck at some point on its downward sloping part of its long-run cost curve. 
Responsible for this development have been inter alia the accumulation of impaired 
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loans (insolvent temporarily or not borrowers, rescheduled loan agreements, and other 
past-due loans) and the adverse consequences of the 2008-2009 Lehman Brothers 
crisis, especially for the south of Eurozone.  The subsequent public policy 
intervention favoring too-big-to-fail financial institutions and increased market 
concentration, is one which, as put by Dijkstra (2013, p. 4), prompts (a) artificial scale 
advantages by acting as de-facto insurance for such institutions and enabling thereby 
to borrow at lowers cost, and (b) scope economies for the mergers, leading to the 
possibility of monopoly rents. And, “Economies of scale and scope arising from 
market power and implicit too-big-to-fail subsidies might benefit individual 
institutions, but harm society as a whole.” 
  
That is, the banking industry has not been anywhere close to workable 
competition and public policy does not appear to be addressing this problem properly. 
Nevertheless, note that this is a problem worsening with public debt accumulation, 
(United States, Southern Eurozone), because banks are among other things holders of 
such debt as well. In the next section, the optimality of the number and size of banks 
is put within this precisely context theoretically, and is found to depend heavily on the 
course of the public debt, ceteris paribus. From this point of view, and if the 
subjugation of a debt problem is considered to be welfare-enhancing, a public policy 
promoting a banking sector with a limited number of healthy banks is in the right 
direction. Section 3 concludes with a discussion of this policy in connection with the 
size of the banks and the political economy surrounding public policy. 
2. Theoretical Considerations 
The discussion of bank industry structure is made in the spirit of Hodgman 
(1961) and Cohen (1970). If Dμ is deposit per customer μ=1, 2, …, Μ, at bank 
j=1,2,…J, the average balance-sheet ratio of earning assets, Aj, to average deposits, 
Dj, it can support is: Dμ(Aj/Dj), earning a revenue of θDμ(Aj/Dj)  and hence, a profit 
Πj= θDμ(Aj/Dj)−cj, where θ is the return on assets, net of asset costs. Under perfect 
competition, Πj=0 and Dμ
min
=(1/θ)(Dj/Aj)cj, where cj is the average deposit service 
costs, and where the superscript “min” indicates that this is the minimum supply of 
demand deposits per customer. The total supply by bank j is: ΣμDμ
min
=D
min
, and the 
total supply by all banks is: (1/θ)Σj(Dj/Aj)cj=(1/θ)(D/A)c, so that D
min
=(1/θ)(D/A)c, 
given identical customers and identical banks.  
Relating next the continuum of market structures with Cournot-type 
interaction in a Klein-Monti-Freixas and Rochet fashion (Klein 1971, Monti 1972, 
Freixas and Rochet (2008), the following general relationship between supply of 
demand deposits and market structure obtains: 
 
where s denotes supply, and limj→∞D
s
=D
min
. This expression gives bank supply of 
demand deposits conditional on industry structure and on demand deposits already in 
the system. Letting the demand function for demand deposits be  
 
with η, a, and γ being constants, and T being the appropriate demand constraint, 
equilibrium implies that: 
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which equality yields that:  
 
 
A bank continues operating as long as θ≥0.  
Letting M and h be the money stock and asset multiplier, respectively, D=M/h 
and A=M(1−h)/h=D(1−h), (3) becomes: 
 
 
which, when solved for J, gives: 
 
J can be positive if the denominator of (4) is positive, or the same, if:  
 
that is, if, from (1), the supply of deposits is at least: 
 
in which case, (2) gives: 
 
producing when solved for J, (4). 
The positive sign of the derivative: 
 
captures the fact that the bank number increases with the net return on assets; and so 
does with the discrepancy (1−h): 
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Next, let:  
 
where i, iL, and iD are the bond rate, the loan rate and the deposit rate, respectively, 
with B and L being government bonds and private sector loans, correspondingly. That 
is, the public debt consists of long bonds held by the banks, which also hold private 
sector debt; they do so based on the profit margins given by the spreads, (i−iD) and 
(iL−iD). If B=εA and L=(1−ε)A, 0<ε<1, (6) becomes:  
 
θ is a weighted average of the interest rate spreads, and (5) can be positive if J 
increases with at least one spread given the weights, or if the weights change in favor 
of the larger spread given spread sizes, or if a combination of the two is the case. 
To get a glimpse of the mechanics of such changes in connection with the 
public debt below, let us solve (7) for i: 
 
which in view of (3΄) becomes: 
 
The bond rate is directly related with the deposit rate, ∂i/∂iD=1/ε>1, and inversely 
related with the loan rate, ∂i/∂iL=−(1−ε)/ε<0. It is also directly related with J and h: 
 
 
 
Let us now introduce into the discussion the debt-to-GDP ratio, b, as for 
example b is contemplated by European Commission studies (see e.g. Berti et al. 
2013): 
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where the subscript “-1” designates one-period lag, i is the nominal interest rate, g is 
the growth rate of nominal GDP, and pbal denotes the primary budget balance. In 
view of (8), (11) becomes: 
 
and hence, the derivatives of b/b-1 with respect to iL, iD, J, and h, are 1/(1+g) times the 
corresponding derivatives of i. This explains the sign of the derivatives regardless any 
fiscal consolidation effort; the accumulation of debt raises J by increasing ε and 
(i−iD): The government competes with the private sector for bank loans by raising i as 
a means of gaining preferential status given iL and iD. This encourages the entry of 
new banks into the system to profit from deals with the government. A higher in turn 
number of banks can accommodate a higher volume of government borrowing from 
them; and, a higher volume of government borrowing encourages further entry of new 
banks into the system to profit by holding it, and so forth.  
To accommodate the government its increasing dependence on bank 
borrowing, it also raises the reserve ratio, reducing the asset multiplier altogether, thus 
checking the expansion process. The private sector, which bids up iL to compete for 
bank funds, contains the increases in i and J, too. A further deterrent factor comes 
from the fact that governments borrow also from the financial markets in which 
according e.g. to Diamond (1997) make up for the suboptimal presence of private 
investors in it, fostering efficiency in these markets, at the expense thereby of bank 
sector size: In any case, the operation of the Modigliani-Miller theorem is hampered 
by the presence of the government. Another factor that might mitigate its violation 
stems from Besanko and Kanatas’s (1993) observation that once a bank lends, it has 
an incentive to monitor the borrower, who however can now take recourse to the 
financial markets. And, a borrowing government might be thought of ideally as 
exhibiting no different behavior. Nevertheless, when government borrowing is 
extensive, governments are usually found to be intervening in the bank sector directly 
or indirectly, (see e.g. Zheng et al. 2013), and in our case here, in order to ensure 
further government borrowing.  
With or without such intervention, the whole process is an unstable one as the 
signs of the following second-order derivatives:  
 
 
in conjunction with the fact that: ∂i/∂iL=|(1−ε)/ε|, and hence, that: 
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appear to suggest. Figure 1 illustrates the curves implied by these relationships and 
the consequent instability all the way up to h=1, when (9) and (10) become equal to 
zero. Note that at h=1, i and J obtain their maximum values, too. That is, the most a 
bank industry can become competitive is under such a reserve requirement ratio, ρ*, 
as to be rendering h=1, in which case profits are zero, because there can still be 
lending but not bank money expansion. Under this traditional rather than “workable” 
notion of perfect bank competition, positive bank profits are rents from bank money 
expansion, rents known as commercial bank seigniorage, V. Indeed, Baltensperger 
and Jordan’s (1997), for instance, definition of such seigniorage is, V=[iL(1−ρ)− iD]D: 
Setting ρ=(iL−iD)/iL, one obtains that V=0; this ρ is presumably the value of ρ*. 
Noting that: (∂i/∂iD)/(∂i/∂iL)=∂iL/∂iD=(1/ε)/[(1−ε)/ε]=1/(1−ε), i.e. that the change in iL 
exceeds that in iD and hence, that the process leading to iL
max
 leads also to iD
max
<iL
max
 , 
the spead (iL−iD) continues being positive, and banks do continue earning profits 
under perfect competition. Yet, these profits are the normal ones, covering 
opportunity cost, and are distinct from commercial bank seigniorage and from the 
zero accounting profit. 
 
Figure 1: Debt accumulation and bank numbers 
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Solving the commercial bank seigniorage equation for iL: 
iL=(V+iDD)/[(1−ρ)D], and inserting it in (6): 
 
the sign of the derivative: 
 
ascertains even further the conclusions reached so far about bank industry structure 
and its interplay with public debt: i increases as V decreases. From a policy point of 
view, calls for a 100% reserve requirement should actually be calls for such a ρ that 
inhibits bank money expansion, which is achieved through ρ*=(iL−iD)/iL<1, if, of 
course, the target is to nullify commercial bank money creation and seigniorage. Also, 
from the viewpoint of a policy against (excessive) debt accumulation, it is clear that 
raising ρ and through this h too, will make it difficult for banks to hold the public 
debt: b obtains its maximum at h=1, having ρ reached its maximum value, ρ*=ρmax, 
which from the last expression for ρ*, implies that iL
max
= iD /(1−ρ*) under the 
appropriate value of iD, too. From still another debt policy view: Would a 
government, wishing the continuation of the accumulation of debt, want to embrace 
the policy prescription of setting ρ=ρ*? The answer is not only negative but that such 
a government would want in addition to check the process towards h=1 by intervening 
in the banking system directly as e.g. Zheng et al. (2013) maintain, worsening 
subsequently the debt problem.  
Finally, if perfect bank competition is considered to be the optimal one, 
optimal will be the number of banks comprising a banking sector operating by 
covering only its opportunity cost. That is, it is a “relativistic” definition, since we 
have seen that normal only bank profit may be attained in a number of ways. A 
monopoly however bank would be suboptimal under any circumstances as follows: 
Solving (8) for J, yields that: 
 
Assuming that b/b-1=0 and a balanced primary budget in (12), and solving for J, 
gives: 
 
One concludes from their ratio that: 
 
The numerator in the left-hand fraction is greater than one; but, less so were 
Friedman’s rule, i=0, to be assumed. Consequently, under fiscal consolidation with 
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pbal=0, and hence, under declining i, (given from (11) that d(b/b-1)/di=1/(1+g)>0), 
bank competition lessens but not to the point of ending up in one only bank 
monopolizing the bank sector. Anyway, the overall policy prescription emerging from 
these considerations regarding fiscal consolidation is the encouragement of a 
restructuring of the bank sector towards a smaller one in terms of number of banks, 
operating with normal only profit. 
This policy prescription follows directly from our equations, but needs to be 
discussed further, because it hinges upon the intergenerational dimension of the public 
debt. Debt holding by the banks serves inter alia as a risk-sharing device against 
intergenerational consumption risks associated with illiquidity shocks in a Diamond 
and Dybvig (1983) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) fashion. Banks simply provide 
insurance to individuals and firms against such shocks, because the competitive 
Arrow-Debreu insurance markets cannot do it efficiently. From this point of view, our 
policy prescription is one in the spirit of the proposition that Friedman’s rule 
generates efficiency when banks enjoy some monopolistic power, as contemplated 
above, and when combined with a proper discount window regardless bank industry 
structure (see e.g. Matsuoka 2011). Our overall policy prescription should be 
complemented in compliance with the second part of this proposition, because setting 
iL=(V+iD D)/[(1−ρ)D] in (13) and (14), the left-hand fraction of (15) is replaced by 
the ratio: 
 
which obtains when i=0 and iD
*
=iL(1−ρ*)<=>V=0. (15) holds regardless the size of V, 
and becomes (15΄) when V=0. It is worth noting that under a full-reserve requirement, 
ρ*=1, (15΄) becomes equal to one, that is, such a requirement would dictate monopoly 
banking, which according to (15) would be suboptimal. Nevertheless, a similar result 
may be obtained through other combinations of ρ*,  iD
*
, and ε. In general, (15΄) is 
greater than or equal to unity, since 1≥ρ*=>ε≥ερ*=>0≥−ε(1−ρ*)=> iD
*
(ρ*−ε)≥ 
iD
*
(ρ*−ε)− ε(1−ρ*). It is illustrated arithmetically by Table 1 in the Appendix, based 
on data from 35 developing economies.  
Anyway, we just saw that once intergenerational considerations are introduced 
into the discussion, the standard-textbook notion of perfect competition becomes 
suboptimal relative to the notion of workable competition in so far as the optimal 
number of banks is concerned. The latter notion does not preclude the presence of 
positive profit and such should be the profit if optimality is sought from the 
intergenerational point of view. Bank profits are simply rents from the issuance of the 
bank money needed to prevent disturbances in intergenerational transfers that would 
disrupt liquidity and the course of debt accumulation. Judging the dynamics between 
debt evolvement and bank numbers from the viewpoint of the textbook concept of 
perfect competition circumvents the intergenerational dimension of this interaction. 
And, this, in turn disregards the possibility of generation-specific bank-runs against 
which banks have to be insured by creating bank money out of profit.  
3. Concluding Remarks 
In any case, the optimal number of banks has been found to be related 
intimately with the course of debt accumulation; intimately, but not uniquely, because 
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a given debt level may be consistent with different numbers of banks depending on 
the overall government policy. From the point of view of policy regarding banking 
with a view towards fiscal consolidation, a limited number of “systemic” banks, 
operating efficiently would be in line with workable competition. This “efficiently” 
touches upon the issue of the size distribution of banks, which our formal modeling 
assumes away; all banks are assumed to be identical. If the number of banks expands 
with debt accumulation, it means that originally there were a number of banks of 
certain size whose increasing debtholding prompts the entry into the industry of new 
banks to unbend the subsequent rationing of private loans and take advantage of bond 
rates that compete with lending rates. Are the new banks smaller or larger than the 
original ones? 
If we assume that entry does not alter bank size and at the same time that the 
optimal would be a few systemic banks, it will be equivalent to claiming that entry 
weakens uniformly over the industry the economies of scale and scope needed to 
avoid intergenerational liquidity disturbances. At the other end, if we maintain that 
entry does alter the size distribution of banks, the following two are the cases that 
should be contemplated. Either that originally there was either a competitive fringe in 
which the smallness of bank size was prohibitive of realizing fully the improved scale 
prospects, and new bigger banks had to come and fill the gap. Or, that originally there 
were a few banks which were refraining from taking advantage of these prospects just 
because profit maximization under monopoly power dictates so, leaving thereby room 
for the entrance of new smaller firms to come and benefit from covering the portion 
of the market left over by the large banks. 
It is clear therefore that the size distribution of banks is an empirical case-by-
case matter; the fact remains that fiscal consolidation presupposes the restructuring of 
the industry towards a few healthy number of banks, which certainly cannot be the 
too-big-to-fail ones. Fiscal consolidation per se presupposes the fewness of banks, 
since it is based on austerity, which in turn affects adversely banking business. The 
whole policy matter towards the bank sector is a political economy one; a matter of 
bank regulation and supervision and of contract enforceability given that “political 
economy variables not only influence market structure directly but also affect the 
relation between efficiency and structure” (González 2009, p. 737) Opportunistic 
governments which are typically driven by partisan monetary policy (see e.g. Drazen 
2001) might upset considerably the industry, which is simply a “must not do” (see e.g 
Llewellyn 2006), let alone Zheng’s et al. (2013) fears for direct corrupt intervention.  
As Rochet (2007, p. 21) observes, “[m]ore than 130 out of 180 of the IMF 
countries have… experienced crises or serious banking problems”; problems 
amplified by political interference and public policy inconsistencies, and with fiscal 
costs ranging from 12% to 40% of the country’s GDP.  Indeed, we have already seen 
that in the presence of government, the Modigliani-Miller theorem does not hold, and 
that the altered capital structure of the bank does affect growth prospects, through 
Thakor’s (1996) six channels: screening by banks, credit rationing by banks, liquidity 
transformation and bank runs, loan commitments by banks, debt restructuring, and the 
feedback role of financial markets. And, for King and Levine (1993) among many 
others, these are the channels upon which a Schumpeterian-growth minded financial 
system is built. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE 1: Reserve ratio and debtholding under i=0 according to (15΄) 
 
Country Name ρ* Deposit Rate ε=0,0 ε=0,1 ε=0,2 ε=0,3 ε=0,4 ε=0,5 
Algeria 0,78125 1,75 1 1,018692 1,044944 1,084507 1,150943 1,285714 
Angola 0,783648329 3,603640267 1 1,00886 1,021005 1,038681 1,066776 1,118356 
Bahrain 0,820353494 1,084166667 1 1,023544 1,056436 1,105621 1,187193 1,348837 
Belize 0,645321187 4,4125 1 1,014961 1,037452 1,075074 1,15083 1,382287 
Bhutan 0,607142857 5,5 1 1,014286 1,036364 1,075 1,16 1,5 
Bolivia 0,853959525 1,626153071 1 1,012055 1,028241 1,051122 1,085933 1,145293 
Botswana 0,6720375 3,6075875 1 1,016149 1,040061 1,079105 1,154296 1,359089 
Brazil 0,784165231 7,907466502 1 1,004006 1,009433 1,017204 1,029251 1,05045 
Brunei Darussalam 0,957901684 0,231540741 1 1,021652 1,050397 1,090403 1,149899 1,247714 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0,728644247 7,719166667 1 1,005623 1,013479 1,025224 1,044699 1,083276 
Costa Rica 0,73981545 4,738611111 1 1,008656 1,020765 1,03891 1,069098 1,129278 
Dominica 0,657401128 3,098115385 1 1,020241 1,05081 1,10232 1,207504 1,541491 
Gambia 0,589285714 11,5 1 1,007353 1,018692 1,038462 1,081633 1,25 
Guatemala 0,607513594 5,293333333 1 1,014827 1,037764 1,077976 1,166759 1,526316 
Guyana 0,89011523 1,523125 1 1,009215 1,021354 1,038073 1,062563 1,101886 
Haiti 0,94916519 0,454166667 1 1,013357 1,030802 1,054548 1,088764 1,142332 
Jamaica 0,799599263 3,532718757 1 1,008175 1,019287 1,035265 1,060202 1,104572 
Lesotho 0,718356255 2,85 1 1,016241 1,039641 1,07627 1,141769 1,292469 
Liberia 0,741092344 3,5 1 1,011673 1,028111 1,052977 1,094989 1,181214 
Madagascar 0,825 10,5 1 1,002304 1,005362 1,009615 1,015936 1,026316 
Malawi 0,657402681 11,07612374 1 1,00558 1,01371 1,026655 1,050494 1,108961 
Maldives 0,644140249 3,730764005 1 1,017842 1,04488 1,090692 1,185226 1,494492 
Mauritania 0,658235294 5,81 1 1,01065 1,02635 1,051813 1,100251 1,228311 
Mexico 0,771358112 1,081666667 1 1,032509 1,079904 1,155447 1,294804 1,637959 
Micronesia 0,970961359 0,415833333 1 1,008083 1,01845 1,03223 1,051439 1,080075 
Nicaragua 0,916974143 0,995837711 1 1,01031 1,023811 1,042252 1,068957 1,111079 
Panama 0,689821515 2,143333333 1 1,025153 1,062801 1,125331 1,249584 1,616016 
Papua New Guinea 0,955077824 0,485833333 1 1,010932 1,025106 1,044217 1,071388 1,11308 
Paraguay 0,771784201 3,915833333 1 1,008751 1,02081 1,038486 1,066898 1,120094 
Peru 0,872295834 2,456633333 1 1,006777 1,015707 1,028013 1,046054 1,075055 
Singapore 0,974752169 0,135833333 1 1,02171 1,050401 1,090086 1,148579 1,243408 
Swaziland 0,718285714 2,465 1 1,018832 1,046136 1,089286 1,167715 1,35461 
Timor-Leste 0,925857087 0,905304977 1 1,010016 1,023087 1,040861 1,066436 1,106387 
Tonga 0,624508867 4,078333333 1 1,017867 1,045344 1,093035 1,196226 1,586626 
Uruguay 0,602665387 4,449826677 1 1,018085 1,046409 1,0971 1,213939 1,769504 
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Calculations based on data from the World Bank: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FR.INR.LNDP/countries, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FR.INR.LEND/countries, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FR.INR.DPST/countries. 
ρ* is calculated as if the current country interest rates were the ones consistent with 
V=0, i=0, and ρ=1; the optimal number of banks is thereby one; and the increase in ε 
indicates the increase in the percentage of bonds held in this bank’s portfolio. 
Debtholding operates like a more than 100% reserve requirement for the bank. For 
example, given the value of ρ* for Algeria, the number 1,285714 indicates that 50% 
of the bank’s portfolio in the form of bonds is equivalent to having it under a reserve 
ratio, ρ, equal to 128.5714%; or the same, 0.285714 more banks would be needed like 
the one operating under V=0, i=0, and ρ=1, i.e. like the monopoly bank, to make 
possible such a debtholding under V=0, i=0, and ρ=1. 
